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Abstract
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are p ≥ 2
types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of
each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without mon-
etary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on their
preferences over bundles of items, such that each agent gets
one item of each type. In sharp contrast to classical housing
markets, previous studies in multi-type housing markets have
been hindered by the lack of natural solution concepts, be-
cause the strict core might be empty.
We break the barrier in the literature by leveraging AI tech-
niques and making natural assumptions on agents’ prefer-
ences. We show that when agents’ preferences are lexico-
graphic, even with different importance orders, the classi-
cal top-trading-cycles mechanism can be extended while pre-
serving most of its nice properties. We also investigate com-
putational complexity of checking whether an allocation is in
the strict core and checking whether the strict core is empty.
Our results convey an encouragingly positive message: it is
possible to design good mechanisms for multi-type housing
markets under natural assumptions on preferences.
Introduction
In this paper, we ask the following question: is it possi-
ble at all to design good mechanisms for multi-type hous-
ing markets? In multi-type housing markets (Moulin 1995;
Konishi, Quint, and Wako 2001; Wako 2005; Klaus 2008),
there are multiple types of items, each agent is initially en-
dowed one item of each type. The goal is to design mecha-
nisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the
agents based on their preferences over bundles of items, such
that each agent gets one item of each type.
Multi-type housing markets are often described using
examples of houses and cars as metaphors for indivisi-
ble items. However, the allocation problem is applicable to
many other types of items and scarce resources. For exam-
ple, students may want to exchange papers and dates for
presentation (Mackin and Xia 2016); in cloud computing,
agents may want to allocate multiple types of resources,
including CPU, memory, and storage (Ghodsi et al. 2011;
Ghodsi et al. 2012); patients may want to allocate multi-
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ple types of medical resources, including surgeons, nurses,
rooms, and equipments (Huh, Liu, and Truong 2013).
Mechanism design for single-type housing markets is a
well-established field in economics, often referred to as
housing markets (Shapley and Scarf 1974). In housing mar-
kets, the most sensible solution concept is the strict core,
which is the set of allocations where no group of agents
have incentive to deviate by exchanging their initial en-
dowments within the group. Strict core is desirable because
it is an intuitive stable solution, and when agents’ prefer-
ences are linear orders, the strict core allocation always ex-
ists and is unique, which can be computed in polynomial
time by Gale’s celebrated Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) algo-
rithm (Shapley and Scarf 1974; Roth and Postlewaite 1977;
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999). TTC enjoys many de-
sirable axiomatic properties including individual rationality,
Pareto optimality, and group strategy-proofness. Many ex-
tensions of TTC to other single-type housing markets have
been proposed and studied. See more details in Related
Work.
In sharp contrast to the popularity of housing markets,
there is little research on multi-type housing markets, de-
spite their importance and generality. A potential reason for
the absence of positive results is that the strict core can be
empty or multi-valued in multi-type housing markets (Kon-
ishi, Quint, and Wako 2001). Therefore, as So¨nmez and
U¨nver (2011) noted: “Positive results of this section [on
housing markets] no longer hold in an economy in which
one agent can consume multiple houses or multiple types of
houses”. This is the problem we address in this paper and
provide a number of positive results, a first in this field.
Our contributions
In this paper, we present novel algorithms building on AI
techniques in preference representation and reasoning for
allocation in multi-type housing markets. We assume that
agents’ preferences are represented by arbitrary acyclic CP-
nets (Boutilier et al. 2004). Different agents may have ar-
bitrarily different CP-net structure. We also assume that
agents’ preferences are lexicographic, meaning that agents
have arbitrary importance orders over item types.
We propose the following natural extension of TTC,
which we call Multi-type TTC (MTTC) for multi-type hous-
ing markets. MTTC builds a directed bipartite graph in each
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round, where agents and items are two separated groups of
vertices. There is an edge (a, bi), where a is an agent and
bi is agent b’s initial type-i endowment, if (1) the most im-
portant type for agent a, from which she has not obtained
an item, is type i, and (2) bi is agent a’s top-ranked type-i
item among remaining type-i items. For any type i and any
agent b, there is an edge (bi, b). Then, MTTC finds and im-
plements all cycles as TTC does, but only removes the items
in the cycle. The agents always remain in the graph.
We note that in MTTC, a cycle may involve items of mul-
tiple types. Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 1. For lexicographic preferences, MTTC runs in
polynomial-time and satisfies strict-core-selection (which
implies Pareto optimality and individual rationality), non-
bossiness, and strong group strategy-proofness when agents
cannot lie about importance orders over types.
We note that Theorem 1’s assumption on lexicographic
preferences are not only very mild given agents can have
arbitrarily different CP-net structure and importance or-
ders, but also an extension of naturalistic decision making
structures studied in cognitive science literature for order-
ing items based on multiple criteria (Luan, Schooler, and
Gigerenzer 2014). This positive result is especially surpris-
ing when it is put in comparison with similar research in
combinatorial voting, where negative results emerge as soon
as agents do not share similar CP-net structures (Lang and
Xia 2016).
We also prove an impossibility theorem to show that The-
orem 1 cannot be improved by allowing agents to lie about
the importance order. As for computing other strict cores,
we prove that, it is coNP-complete to check whether a given
allocation is in the strict core, even for two types of items
and agents with separable preferences w.r.t. the same impor-
tance order. This hardness result is unexpected due to rela-
tively small number of bundles (n2), and the simplicity of
the underlying preference structures. Furthermore, the same
problem for single-type housing market can be easily com-
puted in polynomial time. We also prove that it is NP-hard
to check whether the strict core is non-empty.
We expect that the availability of MTTC will allow devel-
opment of many applications for multi-type housing mar-
kets, especially those discussed in the beginning of the In-
troduction.
Related Work and Discussions
Housing markets are closely related to house allocation,
where agents do not have initial endowments, and match-
ing, where houses also have preferences over agents.
See (So¨nmez and U¨nver 2011) for a recent survey. In the
past decade, housing markets has been a popular topic under
multi-agent resource allocation (Chevaleyre et al. 2006).
Many subsequent works in Economics and AI extend the
standard, single-type housing markets. For example, agents
may be indifferent between houses (Quint and Wako 2004;
Yilmaz 2009; Alcalde-Unzu and Molis 2011; Jaramillo and
Manjunath 2012; Aziz and de Keijzer 2012; Plaxton 2013;
Saban and Sethuraman 2013). Agents may desire mul-
tiple houses (Pa´pai 2007; Todo, Sun, and Yokoo 2014;
Sonoda et al. 2014; Fujita et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2015).
Some agents may not have initial endowments (Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999; Chen and So¨nmez 2002; So¨nmez
and U¨nver 2010).
In our setting, agent’s preferences are represented by the
celebrated CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004). A CP-net al-
lows agents to specify preferences over items within each
type given other items allocated to her. In general, a CP-
net represents a partial order over bundles of items. CP-
nets have been heavily used in combinatorial voting, see
for example (Rossi, Venable, and Walsh 2004; Lang 2007;
Lang and Xia 2016), but negative results often emerge as
soon as agents’ CP-nets do not line up. Lexicographic or-
ders (Booth et al. 2010) are special linear orders that extend
some CP-nets, where agents can specify importance orders
over types.
Previously, Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (2009) proposed
a CP-net-like language and Fujita et al. (2015) used lexico-
graphic orders to model agents’ preferences over bundles of
items of a single type. Monte and Tumennasan (2015) char-
acterized strategy-proof mechanisms for multi-type house
allocation, when agents’ preferences include lexicographic
preferences. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first time that CP-nets and lexicographic preferences are in-
vestigated in multi-type housing markets.
Konishi, Quint, and Wako (2001) assumed that agents
have separable and additive preferences. This assumption
is in general incomparable to our assumptions on agents’
preferences, because preferences represented by CP-nets are
generally not separable, except when the CP-net has no
edges. Therefore, our positive results are not obtained by
putting further restrictions on agents’ preferences.
There has been very little work on multi-type hous-
ing markets after Konishi, Quint, and Wako’s negative re-
sults (Wako 2005; Klaus 2008). These papers focus on a
different solution concept called coordinate-wise core rule,
which are composed of type-wise strict-core allocations. We
show that this naturally corresponds to the output of MTTC
when agents’ have separable and lexicographic preferences
with a common importance order.
Preliminaries
We consider a market consisting of a set N = {1, ..., n} of
agents with p ≥ 2 types of indivisible items. For any i ≤ p,
there are n items of type i, denoted by Ti = {i1, . . . , in}.
For each item o, Type(o) is the type of o, that is, o ∈ TType(o).
Each agent j ∈ N initially owns exactly one item of each
type, and her endowment is denoted by a p-vector O(j).
W.l.o.g. in this paper we let O(j) = (j1, . . . , jp). Let T =
T1× · · · ×Tp be the set of all bundles, each of which is rep-
resented by a p-vector. We will often use vectors such as ~d
and ~e to represent bundles, and for any i ≤ p, let [~d]i denote
the type-i item in ~d. A multi-type housing marketM is given
by the tuple (N, {T1, . . . , Tp}, O).
Each agent desires to consume exactly one item of each
type, and her preferences are represented by a linear order
over T . A preference profile P = (R1, . . . , Rn) is a collec-
tion of agents’ preferences. In any multi-type housing mar-
ket M , an allocation A is a mapping from N to T such that
for any j ≤ n, A(j) is the bundle allocated to j. Since no
item is allocated twice, we have that for any j 6= j′ and any
i ≤ p, [A(j)]i 6= [A(j′)]i. Given a market M , a mechanism
f is a function that maps agents’ profile P to an allocation
in M .
Axiomatic Properties
A mechanism f satisfies individually rationality if for any
profile P , no agent prefers her initial endowment to her al-
location by f . f satisfies Pareto optimality if for any profile
P , there does not exist an allocation A such that (1) every
agent weakly prefers her allocation in A to her allocation in
f(P ), and (2) some agent strictly prefers her allocation in A
to that in f(P ). f is non-bossy if for any profile P , no agent
can change any other agent’s allocation without changing
her own by reporting differently. f is strategy-proof if for
each agent, falsely reporting her preferences is not benefi-
cial. A mechanism satisfies strong group strategy-proofness
if there is no group of agents S who can falsely report their
preferences so that (1) every agent in S gets a weakly pre-
ferred bundle, and (2) at least one agent in S gets a strictly
preferred bundle.
An allocation A is said to be weakly blocked by a coali-
tion S ⊆ N , if the agents in S can find an allocation B of
their initial endowments so that each agent weakly prefers
allocation in B to that in A, and some agent is strictly better
off in B than in A. The strict core of a market is the set of
all allocations that are not weakly blocked by any coalition.
A mechanism f is strict-core-selecting, if for any profile P ,
f(P ) is always in the strict core.
CP-nets and Lexicographic Preferences
A (directed) CP-net N over T is defined by (i) a directed
graph G = ({T1, ..., Tp}, E), called the dependency graph,
and (ii) for each Ti, there is a conditional preference table
CPTi that contains a linear order i~u over Ti for each val-
uation ~u of the parents of Ti in G, denoted Pa(Ti). Each
CPT-entry i~u carries the following meaning: my prefer-
ences over type i is i~u given that I get items ~u, and these
preferences are independent of other items I get. An agents’
preferences are separable if there are no edges in the depen-
dency graph.
Each CP-net N represents a partial order N , which is
the transitive closure of preference relations represented by
all CPT entries, which are {(ai, ~u, ~z) N (bi, ~u, ~z) : i ≤
p; ai, bi ∈ Ti; ~u ∈ TPa(Ti);~z ∈ T−(Pa(Ti)∪{Ti})}.
For example, Figure 1 illustrates a separable CP-net.
There are two types: houses (H) and cars (C), with two items
per type. Since the preferences are separable, there is no
edge in the dependency graph (in the left of the figure). The
CPTs are shown in the middle of the Figure 1, and the partial
order represented by the CP-net is shown in the right.
Let O = [T1 B · · ·B Tp] be a linear order over the types.
A CP-net is O-legal, if there is no edge (Tk, Tl) with k > l
in its dependency graph. A lexicographic extension of an
O-legal CP-net N is a linear order V over T , where for
any i ≤ p, any ~x ∈ T1 × · · · × Ti−1, any ai, bi ∈ Ti,
H
C
Pref. over H
1H  2H
Pref. over C
1C  2C
(1H , 1C) (1H , 2C)
(2H , 1C) (2H , 2C)
Figure 1: A CP-net.
and any ~y, ~z ∈ Ti+1 × · · · × Tp, if ai i~x bi in N , then
(~x, ai, ~y) V (~x, bi, ~z). In other words, the agent believes
that type T1 is most important type to her, T2 is the second
most important type, etc. In a lexicographic extension, O is
called the importance order.
In this paper an agent’s preferences are lexicographic,
which means that each agent’s ranking is a lexicographic ex-
tension of a CP-net. We note that the CP-net does not need
to be separable and the importance order can be different.
Example 1. Suppose the agent’s preferences is lexico-
graphic w.r.t. the separable CP-net in Figure 1 and the im-
portance order H BC, then her preferences are (1H , 1C) 
(1H , 2C)  (2H , 1C)  (2H , 2C). If her importance order
is C BH , then her preferences are (1H , 1C)  (2H , 1C) 
(1H , 2C)  (2H , 2C).
The Multi-Type TTC Mechanism
We propose the multi-type TTC (MTTC) mechanism as Al-
gorithm 1. MTTC assumes that agents’ preferences are lex-
icographic (w.r.t. possibly different importance orders and
possibly different CP-net structures).
Algorithm 1 MTTC
1: Input: A multi-type housing market M and a profile P
of lexicographic preferences.
2: t← 1. Let L← ∪i≤pTi be the set of unallocated items.
Let A be the empty assignment. For each j ≤ n, let i∗j
is agent j’s most desirable type.
3: while L 6= ∅ do
4: Build a directed graph Gt = (N ∪ L,E). For every
j ∈ N, ji ∈ L, add edge (ji, j) to E. For every
j ∈ N , add edge (j, jˆi∗j ) to her most preferred item
in L of type i∗j , to E.
5: Implement cycles in Gt. For each cycle C, for ev-
ery (j, jˆi∗j ) ∈ C, assign [A(j)]i∗j = [O(jˆ)]i∗j .
6: Remove assigned items from L.
7: For any agent j who is assigned an item, set i∗j to be
the next type according to j’s importance order.
8: t← t+ 1.
9: end while
10: Output: The allocation A.
Example 2. Consider the market with 3 agents and 2 types:
Houses (H) and Cars (C) with items {1H , 2H , 3H} and
{1C , 2C , 3C}, respectively. Let the initial endowments of
each agent j be (jH , jC). Figure 2 shows agents’ lexico-
Agent 1 H B C
H prefs. 2H  others
C prefs. 3C  1C  2C
Agent 2 H B C
H prefs. 3H  others
C prefs. 2C  others
Agent 3 H B C
H prefs. 1H  others
C prefs. 3C  1C  2C
Agent	1
1" 1#
Agent	2
2" 2#
Agent	3
3" 3# ⇒
G1
2"
Agent	11#
3"
Agent	2
2#
1"Agent	3
3# ⇒
2"
Agent	1
3" 2#
Agent	2
1" 3'Agent	3
⇒
2" 1'
Agent	1
3" 2#
Agent	2
1" 3'Agent	3
C1 C3
C2
𝐶)𝐶* 𝐶+ 𝐶,
1#C4
G2 G3
Figure 2: A lexicographic and separable profile P and an execution of MTTC on P .
graphic preferences and the execution of MTTC. In par-
ticular, Figure 2 shows the graphs G1, G2, G3 constructed
in each round, and all the four cycles implemented in
MTTC. The output is the allocation A such that A(1) =
(2H , 1C), A(2) = (3H , 2C), A(3) = (1H , 3C).
It is not hard to see that when all agents have the same
importance order, the output of MTTC is the same as out-
come of the following p-step process. W.l.o.g. let the impor-
tance order is T1 B T2 B · · · B Tp. For each step i, we ask
the agents to report their preferences over Ti, conditioned on
items they got in previous steps; then we use TTC to allocate
the item, and move to the next step. In particular, when all
agents’ preference are separable, MTTC coincides with the
coordinate-wise core rule (Konishi, Quint, and Wako 2001).
Theorem 1. When agents’ preferences are lexicographic,
MTTC runs in polynomial-time and satisfies strict-core-
selecting (which implies Pareto optimality and individual
rationality) and non-bossiness, and is group strategy-proof
when agents cannot lie about importance orders over types.
Proof. The proof is done in the following steps.
Step 1: MTTC outputs an allocation in polynomial time.
At any round t, if L is non empty, there is a cycle inGt since
every node has either: an indegree of 1 and an outdegree of
1, or no incoming and no outgoing edges.
At every round the algorithm permanently assigns exactly
as many items as there are agents in the cycles, one to each
agent. There are exactly as many items of each type as there
are agents who have not yet been assigned an item of the
type.
At every round, if an agent j is involved in a cycle, she
receives exactly one item, the item she has an outgoing
edge to. An item once assigned is removed and is never re-
assigned. Once an agent receives an item of a given type, she
may never receive another item of the same type. The algo-
rithm does not terminate if any items remain unassigned.
At every round of the algorithm, there is at least one agent
who is permanently assigned an item of some type. Thus,
there are at most np rounds. At each round we must compute
the pointing graph G. For every agent, there is a single most
desired type. It takes O(n) time to find the most preferred
remaining item. The algorithm runs in O(n2p) time.
Step 2: MTTC satisfies strict-core-selecting. For the sake
of contradiction, let the allocation A produced by the algo-
rithm does not belong to the strict core. Then, there exists
a coalition S, and an allocation B on S that blocks A. Let
t∗ be the first round in which the algorithP’s assignments
restricted to S at the end of the round differs from the as-
signments in B. Then, there is some j ∈ S, a type i such
that at least one of the following cases hold:
(1) j is assigned a different item of type i in B than in A, or
(2) the item ji initially endowed to an agent in S is assigned
to a different agent in B than in A.
Suppose Case (1) holds. There exists some agent j ∈ S,
a type i such that j∗i = [B(j)]i 6= [A(j)]i = jˆi. Note that
t∗ is the first iteration where the allocations differ, and the
algorithm assigns items of agents’ most desired type. Then,
we must have that j∗i  jˆi since for every type that takes
precedence over i, the allocation in B is the same as the
allocation in A. Now, if j∗i was available at round t
∗, then
we must have that the only outgoing edge from j points at
the owner j∗i and not at jˆi at round t. This is a contradiction
to the assumption that A is an output of the algorithm. If j∗i
was unavailable at round t∗, then it must already have been
assigned to another agent in a strictly earlier round t′ < t∗
which is a contradiction to our assumption that t∗ is the first
round where assignments restricted to S differ.
Now, consider Case (2). We will show that it reduces
to Case (1). Suppose different agents jˆ and j∗ receive
item ji in A and B respectively i.e. [A(jˆ)]i = ji =
[B(j∗)]i, jˆ 6= j∗. Let C be the cycle that is imple-
mented at round t∗ of the algorithm. W.L.O.G. let C con-
sist of edges (1, 2i1), . . . , (k, 1ik), (1ik , 1), involving agents
1, . . . , k whose most desirable types are i1, . . . , ik at round
t∗.
Let agent 1 ∈ S, 1ik is an item owned by an agent in S,
and the agents who receive 1ik differs in A,B. Now, if k ∈
S, we must have that [B(k)]ik 6= [A(k)]ik = 1ik since 1ik
is being assigned to a different agent in B and this reduces
to Case (1). If k /∈ S, there must be some consecutive pair
of nodes j, j + 1ij in C such that 2 ≤ j ≤ k, j + 1 /∈ S.
Then, we must have that [B(j)]ij 6= [A(j)]ij since j can
only be assigned items initially endowed to agents in S in
the allocation B. Again, this reduces to Case (1).
Step 3: Defining MTTC*, the single-cycle-elimination
variant of MTTC. To prove the non-bossiness, monotonic-
ity, and strong group-strategy-proofness, we will consider
a class of algorithms called MTTC*, which is similar to
MTTC except that in each round a single trading cycle is
implemented. There are multiple MTTC* algorithms, each
corresponds to a different order of implementing cycles. Just
by definition we do not know yet whether different MTTC*
algorithms correspond to different allocations. Later we will
show that, indeed different MTTC* algorithms on the same
preferences must output the same allocation. In fact, we will
prove a stronger lemma (Lemma 1) that characterizes the
executions of all MTTC* algorithms.
Definition 1. Given a housing market M and any profile P ,
let MTTC*(P ) denote the set of algorithms, each of which
is a modification of MTTC (Algorithm 1), where instead of
implementing all cycles in each round, the algorithm imple-
ments exactly one available cycle in each round.
We note that MTTC*(P ) depends on P because for dif-
ferent profiles the cycles in each round might be different.
For each A ∈ MTTC*(P ), we let Order(A) denote the
linear order over the cycles that A implements. That is, if
Order(A) = C1  · · ·  Ck, then it means that for any
t ≤ k, Ct is the cycle implemented by A in round t.
Example 3. Let M,P be the same as in Figure 2. Let
C1, C2, C3, C4 be the same cycles in Figure 2. Let A be the
MTTC* algorithm such that for any t ≤ 4, in the t-th round
Ci is implemented. Then, Order(A) = C1  C2  C3 
C4.
Definition 2. For any multi-type housing market M , let
Cycles(P ) denote the set of cycles implemented in the ex-
ecution of MTTC on P . We define a partial order PO(P )
over Cycles(P ) as follows. For every pair of cycles Ck, Cl,
Ck  Cl in PO(P ) if one of the following two conditions
hold:
1. There is an agent who gets an item of a more important
type in Ck than in Cl. That is, ∃j ∈ Ck ∩ Cl such that
Type(Ck(j))Bj Type(Cl(j)).
2. There is an agent in Cl who prefers an item in Ck over the
item she is pointing to in Cl of the same type, conditioned
on the item she got in previous rounds. That is, there ex-
ists j ∈ Cl and j′ ∈ Ck such that, Type(Ck(j′)) =
Type(Cl(j)) and Ck(j′) j Cl(j) conditioned on the
items j got in previous rounds.
Then, PO(P ) is the transitive closure of the two classes of
binary relations mentioned above. Let Ext(P ) denote the set
of linear orders that extend PO(P ).
Example 4. Continuing Example 3, PO(P ) is illustrated in
Figure 3. PO(P ) = {C1  C2, C1  C3, C1  C4, C3 
C4}. For all 2 ≤ i ≤ 4, C1  Ci because houses are more
important than cars to all agents. C3  C4 since agent 1 has
a more preferred car in C3 than in C4.
Agent	1
1" 1#
Agent	2
2" 2#
Agent	3
3" 3# ⇒
G1
2"
Agent	11#
3"
Agent	2
2#
1"Agent	3
3# ⇒
2"
Agent	1
3" 2#
Agent	2
1" 3'Agent	3
⇒
2" 1'
Agent	1
3" 2#
Agent	2
1" 3'Agent	3
C1 C3
C2
𝐶)𝐶* 𝐶+ 𝐶,
1#C4
G2 G3
Figure 3: PO(P ) in Example 4.
We are now ready to present the key lemma that estab-
lishes the equivalence between MTTC*(P ) and Ext(P ).
Lemma 1. For any multi-type housing market M and any
profile P , we have Order(MTTC*(P )) = Ext(P ).
Proof. We first prove the⊇ direction. For anyW ∈ Ext(P ),
we will prove that there exists an MTTC*(P ) algorithm A
that implements cycles exactly as in W . W.l.o.g. let W =
C1  · · ·  Ck. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, W is
not in Order(MTTC*(P )). Let 1 ≤ h ≤ k denote the small-
est number such that there exists A ∈ MTTC*(P ) whose
top h− 1 cycles in Order(A) are exactly C1  · · ·  Ch−1
but whose h-th cycle in Order(A) is not Ch; let A denote
this MTTC* algorithm. Let Gh denote the graph at the be-
ginning of round h of algorithm A.
We now prove that Ch must be in Gh by showing that
each edge (j, oi) in Ch must be in Gh. Suppose for the sake
of contradiction that this is not true and (j, oi) is in Ch but
not inGh. There are three cases: (1) agent j has not obtained
an item in a more important type than i yet; (2) agent j is
pointing to a more preferable item in type i than oi; and (3)
agent j has obtained an item in type i in a previous round.
Case (1) and (2) correspond to the two cases in the definition
of PO(P ) (Definition 2), respectively. Therefore, neither can
hold becauseW is an extension of PO(P ), which means that
the more preferable items must have been allocated in the
first h− 1 rounds of A. The third case cannot be true either,
because otherwise it means that there exists Cl with l ≤
h−1 where j points to a different item in type i than oi. This
means that agent j gets two items in type i in MTTC(P ),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, Ch must be in Gh.
However, this contradicts the minimality of h. Therefore,
W ∈ Order(MTTC*(P )). This proves the ⊇ direction.
We now prove the ⊆ direction. Suppose for the sake
of contradiction there exists A ∈ MTTC*(P ) such that
Order(A) 6∈ Ext(P ). W.l.o.g. let Order(A) = [C1  · · · 
Ch−1  C∗h  · · · ], such that there exits no L ∈ Ext(P )
that agrees with Order(A) with the order of the top h − 1
elements (cycles), but there does not exist L∗ ∈ Ext(P ) that
agrees with Order(A) with the order of the top h cycles.
W.l.o.g. let L = [C1  · · ·  Ck], where Ch 6= C∗h. By
the ⊇ direction, there exists AL ∈ MTTC*(P ) such that
Order(AL) = L.
We claim that C∗h ∈ {Ch+1, . . . , Ck}. Let Gh denote the
graph at the beginning of round h in A. Gh must also be
the graph at the beginning of round h in AL, because the
first h − 1 cycles in Order(A) and those in Order(AL) are
exactly the same. It follows that C∗h is in Gh. Therefore, in
one of the following rounds in AL, C∗h must be implement,
otherwise the items involved in it will never be allocated.
Let C∗h = Cl for some h + 1 ≤ l ≤ k. There must exist
h + 1 ≤ l′ ≤ k such that Cl′  Cl in PO(P ), otherwise
there is an extension PO(P ) where the top h cycles areC1 
· · ·  Ch  Cl, which contradicts the assumption that no
order in Ext(P ) agrees with Order(A) on the top h cycles.
However, by the definition of PO(P ) and by the fact that
Cl′ has not been implemented in the first h − 1 round of
A (as well as AL), it is impossible that Cl is in Gh. This
contradicts the assumption that C∗h = Cl is implemented in
round h by A. This proves the ⊆ direction.
It follows directly from Lemma 1 that the outcomes of
all MTTC*(P ) are the same, which is MTTC(P ). The next
lemma states that under MTTC, no single agent cannot
change the output of MTTC by claiming that the bundle she
got in the original market via MTTC is her top choice. This
property is similar to monotonicity for voting rule.
Lemma 2. For any multi-type housing market M , any
profile P , and any agent j, let P ′ be any market where
agent j changes her top bundle to be MTTC(P )(j) and
other agents’ preferences are the same, then MTTC(P ′) =
MTTC(P ).
Proof. W.l.o.g. let j = 1 and C1 = {Ck1 , Ck2 , . . . , Ckp}
be the set of cycles that involve agent j in Cycles(P ). Let
L ∈ Ext(P ). By Lemma 1, there exists A ∈ MTTC*(P )
such that Order(A) = L.
We next prove that A can be applied to P ′ and the output
is the same as A(P ). To see this, we will examine two par-
allel runs of the execution of A with input P and with input
P ′, respectively. For any t ≥ 0, let Gt and G′t denote the
graphs of MTTC* in the beginning of round t w.r.t. P and
P ′, respectively. We claim that for all t ≤ k, Gt = G′t by
induction. The base case of t = 0 is straightforward. Sup-
pose the claim is truth for all t ≤ h − 1. Then if the h-th
cycle in L is not in C1, then Gh = G′h because all agents
except agent 1 have the same preferences in P and in P ′. If
the h-th cycle in L is in C1, then suppose agent 1 points to an
item oi ∈ Ti in Gt. This means that [MTTC(P )(1)]i = oi.
Therefore, agent 1 also points to oi in G′t. This proves that
Gt = G
′
t for all t ≤ k.
Therefore,A can be successfully applied to P ′ and the al-
location is the same as MTTC(P ). By Lemma 1, MTTC(P ′)
is the same as the output of A on P ′, which proves the
lemma.
Step 4: MTTC satisfies non-bossiness. Suppose for the
sake of contradiction MTTC does not satisfy non-bossiness.
W.l.o.g. let M and P ′ denote two markets where only
agent 1’s preferences are different, MTTC(P )(1) =
MTTC(P ′)(1), yet MTTC(P ) 6= MTTC(P ′). Let Mˆ denote
the market obtained from M by letting agent 1’s top-ranked
bundle to be MTTC(P )(1). By Lemma 2, MTTC(Mˆ) =
MTTC(P ) and MTTC(Mˆ) = MTTC(P ′), which is a con-
tradiction.
Step 5: MTTC is strong group-strategyproof when the
agents cannot lie about the importance orders. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that the proposition is not true
in a multi-type housing market M . Let P denote the truthful
profile, S ⊆ N denote the group of strategic agents, and P ′
denote the untruthful profile where preferences of all truth-
ful agents are the same as in P . Let Pˆ denote the profile ob-
tained from P ′ by letting the top-ranked bundle of all agents
j ∈ S be MTTC(P ′)(j). By sequentially applying Lemma 1
to all agents in S, we have that MTTC(Pˆ ) = MTTC(P ′). In
particular, all agents in S get the same bundles in MTTC(Pˆ )
as those in MTTC(P ′).
We now compare side by side two parallel runs of
two MTTC* algorithms: A ∈ MTTC*(P ) and Aˆ ∈
MTTC*(Pˆ ). We will define A and Aˆ dynamically. Starting
with t = 0, letGt and Gˆt denote the graphs of MTTC* at the
beginning of round t for input P and input Pˆ , respectively.
If there is a common cycle C in Gt and Gˆt, then we let both
A and Aˆ implement C, and move on to the next round.
Because MTTC(P ) 6= MTTC(P ′) = MTTC(Pˆ ), there
exists a round t such that Gt and Gˆt does not have a com-
mon cycle. Let t∗ be the earliest such round. We note that
for any j 6∈ S, the outgoing edge of j in Gt∗ and that in
Gˆt∗ must be same, because j is truthful and the remaining
items in Gt∗ and in Gˆt∗ are the same. Let C denote an ar-
bitrary cycle in Gt∗ . It follows that there exists j ∈ S such
that (j, oi) ∈ C and (j, si∗) ∈ Gˆt∗ , where oi 6= si∗ . Be-
cause no agent is allowed to lie about the importance or-
der, and the allocation of all previous rounds are the same
in A and in Aˆ, we must have i = i∗, si∗ is in Gt, and the
items agent j gets in all previous rounds in A is the same as
that in Aˆ. Therefore, agent j strictly prefers oi to si∗ give
her allocation of more important types in previous rounds
in A/Aˆ. We note that because agent j’s top-ranked bundle
is her final allocation in MTTC(Pˆ ), agent j must get si∗ in
MTTC(Pˆ ). Because agent j gets oi in MTTC(P ), we have
that MTTC(P )(j) j MTTC(Pˆ ). This contradicts the as-
sumption that none of agents in S is strictly worse off in
MTTC(Pˆ ). Therefore, MTTC is strong group-strategyproof
when agents cannot lie about the importance orders.
Proposition 1. MTTC is not strategy-proof w.r.t. only misre-
porting the importance order (i.e. without misreporting local
preferences over types).
Proof. Consider the preferences in Figure 2. We recall
that when agents are truthful, the output of MTTC is
(2H , 1C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 3C) to agents 1, 2, 3, respectively
(Example 2). If agent 1 misreport the importance order as
C B H without misreporting any preferences over types,
Agent 1 H B C
H prefs. 2H  1H  3H
C prefs. 1C  3C  2C
Agent 2 C BH
H prefs. 3H  21  11
C prefs. 2H  others
Agent 3 H B C
H prefs. 1H  3H  2H
C prefs. 1C  3C  2C
Figure 4: An example of 3 agents’ separable lexicographic preferences over 2 categories, Houses (H) and Cars (C).
then the output of MTTC is (2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)
to agents 1, 2, 3, respectively. We note that agent 1 prefers
(2H , 3C) to (2H , 1C). This proves the proposition.
Proposition 2. The strict core of a multi-type housing mar-
ket can be multi-valued, even when agents’ preferences are
separable and lexicographic w.r.t. the same order.
Proof. Consider the preferences in Figure 2. Let B de-
note the allocation such that B(1) = (2H , 3C), B(2) =
(3H , 2C), B(3) = (1H , 1C). For the sake of contradic-
tion, suppose S be a blocking coalition to B. We can ob-
serve that agents 1, 2 each receive their top bundles in B
and have no incentive to participate in a coalition. There-
fore S = N . However, it can be verified that B is Pareto
optimal. Further, agent 3 cannot benefit by not participat-
ing since (1H , 1C)  (3H , 3C). This means that there is no
coalition that blocks B, which is a contradiction.
The next theorem states that, not only is MTTC suscep-
tible to misreporting importance order, but also, all mech-
anisms that satisfies individual rationality and Pareto opti-
mality do. We note the MTTC satisfies strict-core-selecting,
which implies individual rationality and Pareto optimality.
Theorem 2. For any multi-type housing market M with
n ≥ 3 and p ≥ 2, there is no mechanism that satis-
fies individually rationality, Pareto optimality, and strategy-
proofness, even when agents’ preferences are lexicographic
and separable.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let f be any mech-
anism that is individually rational, Pareto-optimal and
strategy-proof. Consider the agents’ lexicographic and sep-
arable preferences P as in Figure 4. Explicitly, P is the fol-
lowing
1: (2H , 1C)  (2H , 3C)  (2H , 2C)  (1H,1C)  others.
2: (3H , 22)  (2H,2C)  others.
3: (1H , 1C)  (1H , 3C)  (1H , 2C)  (3H , 1C) 
(3H,3C)  others.
The only individually rational allocations are:
(1) ((2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)).
(2) ((2H , 1C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 3C)).
(3) ((1H , 1C), (2H , 2C), (3H , 3C)).
Only (i) and (ii) are also Pareto-optimal.
Since f is individually rational and Pareto optimal,
f(P ) must be either ((2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)), or
((2H , 1C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 3C)). We will show that in either
case there is some agent who has an incentive to misreport
her preferences.
Suppose f(P ) = ((2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)). Then,
consider the case where agent 1 misreports her lexico-
graphic order as 2 B 1. Agent 1’s preferences over bun-
dles is (2H , 1C)  (1H , 1C)  others. The alloca-
tion ((2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)) is not individually ra-
tional w.r.t. the profile with agent 1’s misreported prefer-
ences. The only allocation that is both individually ratio-
nal and Pareto optimal w.r.t. the misreported preferences
is ((2H , 1C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 3C)). Therefore, f must se-
lect this allocation. Note that agent 1 does strictly better,
(2H , 1C)  (2H , 3C), when she misreports. This contra-
dicts the assumption that f is strategy-proof.
Suppose f(P ) = ((2H , 1C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 3C)). Then
consider the case where agent 3 misreports her lexicographic
order as 2 B 1, and her local preferences over type 1 as
3H  1H  2H . Agent 3’s preference over bundles is
(3H , 1C)  (1H , 1C)  (2H , 1C)  (3H , 3C)  others.
The only allocation that is both individually rational and
Pareto optimal w.r.t. the profile with agent 3’s misreported
preferences is ((2H , 3C), (3H , 2C), (1H , 1C)). Therefore, f
must select this allocation. Note that agent 3 gets a strictly
better bundle, (1H , 1C) 3 (1H , 3C), when she misreports
her preferences.This contradicts the assumption that f is
strategy-proof.
Therefore, such a mechanism f does not exist. This
proves the theorem.
Computing the Membership of the Strict Core
Definition 3 (InStrictCore). Given a multi-type housing
market M , agents’ preferences P , and an allocation A, we
are asked whether A is a strict core allocation w.r.t. M .
Theorem 3. InStrictCore is co-NPC even when agents have
separable lexicographic preferences over p ≥ 2 types.
Proof. We start by noting that given a blocking coalition S
and an allocation B it is easy to check whether S blocks A
when agents have lexicographic preferences.
We show a reduction from 3-SAT. An instance of 3-SAT
is given by a formula F in 3-CNF, consisting of clauses
c1, ..., cn involving Boolean variables x1, ..., xm that can
take on values in {0,1}, and we are asked whether there is a
valuation of the variables that satisfies F .
Example 5. F = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x¯3) is a
formula in 3-CNF involving variables x1, x2, x3 and clauses
c1 = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3, c2 = x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x¯3. We will use this
example to illustrate the proof.
Given an arbitrary instance I of 3-SAT, we construct an
instance J of InStrictCore where P is a profile of lexico-
graphic preferences over p = 2 types where all agents have
the same importance order 1 B 2, and an allocation A as
follows:
Agents:
• For every clause cj , we have an agent cj .
• For every Boolean variable xi, we have agents 1ji , 0ji , one
for every clause cj that involves literals of the variable xi.
• For every variable xi, we have additional agents xi and
x¯i.
• Additionally, for every variable xi, we have an agent di.
• Lastly, we add agents e1, e2.
Initial Endowments: Every agent a is initially endowed
with the bundle ([a]1, [a]2).
Preferences and Allocations: We will represent agents’
lexicographic preferences in P with importance order 1B 2
for every agent, and their allocated items in A by 2 directed
graphs G1, G2, one for each type. G1, G2 have a node for
each agent.
A dashed edge (a, b) in Gk represents (i) the preference
[b]k  [a]k, and (ii) the allocation [A(a)]k = [b]k. A solid
edge (a, b) indicates a strict preference [b]k  [A(a)]k. The
absence of an edge (a, b) indicates [b]k ≺ [a]k.
– The graph G1 corresponding to Example 5 is in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: The graph G1 represents agents’ preferences and
their allocations in A over type 1 corresponding to Exam-
ple 5. Here, dashed edges represent allocations in A, and
preference over initial endowment, and solid edges repre-
sent strict preference over allocation in A. For example, for
agent 121, [A(1
2
1)]1 = [1
1
2]1  [121] and [012]1  [112]1.
Formally, we construct G1 as follows:
• For each variable xi, for each j ≤ ki−1, we add dashed
edges (1ji , 1
j+1
i ) and (1
ki
i , xi).
• For each variable xi, for each j ≤ ki−1, we add dashed
edges (0ji , 0
j+1
i ) and (0
j
i , x¯i).
• For i ≤ m, we add a dashed edge (xi, 11i+1) and solid
edges (xi, 01i+1), (x¯i, 1
1
i+1), (x¯i, 0
1
i+1).
• For i ≤ m, we add dashed edges (x¯i, di), (di, 01i ).
• For each of j ≤ n− 1, we add dashed edges (cj , cj+1).
• We add dashed edges (e1, c1), (cn, e2).
• Finally, we add dashed edges (e2, 111), (xm, e1), solid
edges (e2, 011), (x¯m, e1).
– We illustrate the construction of G2 in Figure 6.
Formally, G2 is constructed as:
• For i ≤ m, for j ≤ ki, we add dashed edges
(1ji , 1
j
i ), (0
j
i , 0
j
i ).
• For i ≤ m, we add dashed edges (xi, xi), (x¯i, x¯i)
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Figure 6: Graph G2 representing agents’ preferences and
allocations in A over type 2 corresponding Example 5.
• We add dashed edges (cn, cn−1), ..., (c2, c1), (c1, d1),
(d1, d2), ..., (dm−1, dm), (dm, cn).
• For every clause cj , if xi is a literal in cj , we add solid
edges (cj , 1
j
i ), (1
j
i , cj) (similarly, we add solid edges to
and from 0ji is the literal x¯i is involved in clause cj).
• We add dashed edges (e1, e1), (e2, e2).
P is the profile of lexicographic preferences where agent
has the importance order 1B 2 over types and every agents’
local preferences over items of type 1 and type 2 are repre-
sented by the graphsG1 andG2 respectively. This completes
the construction.
We briefly illustrate the idea behind the rest of the proof
using Example 5. Consider the satisfying valuation φ =
(1, 1, 0) . It is easy to verify that there is a coalition of
agents S = {111, 121, x1, 112, 122, x2, 013, 023, y2, e1, c1, c2, e2}.
When agents in S receive items according to the edges in
the cycle involving all of them in G1, they all receive an
item of type 1 that is weakly preferred over their item in
A according to their local preferences given by G1. Agents
c1 and c2 strictly improve over their allocations in A ac-
cording to their preferences in G2 by exchanging items with
agents 111 and 0
2
3 respectively. Now, consider the negative
example of the valuation and ψ = (1, 1, 1) and the coali-
tion {111, 121, x1, 112, 122, x2, 113, 123, x3, e1, c1, c2, e2}. Note
that agents c1 and c2 do not strictly improve over their al-
locations of type 1 inA. They must improve over their items
of type 2. However, agent c2 can only receive a strictly worse
item of type 2 compared to her allocation in A from the
agents in S.
At a high level, we use the construction in graphG1 to en-
sure that the valuation of variables is consistent by ensuring
that for any variable xi, we may only exclusively have either
agents 1ji or 0
j
i in any blocking coalition. We use G2 to en-
sure that if there is a coalition that includes every agent cj ,
then there is a satisfying valuation of the Boolean variables
that satisfies all clauses. We now proceed with the formal
proof.
Claim 1. (⇐) If I is a Yes instance, then J is a No instance.
Proof. Let φ be a valuation that satisfies the formula F in in-
stance I . We will show the existence of a blocking coalition
in J .
– Consider the coalition S:
• ∀i ≤ m, if φi = 1 (similarly 0), then ∀j ≤ ki, 1ji ∈ S and
xi ∈ S (similarly 0ji , x¯i).
• ∀j ≤ n, cj ∈ S.
• e1, e2 ∈ S.
We will now construct an allocation B on S that weakly
improves every agents’ allocation over A and is strictly im-
proving for some agent. We will construct B by identifying
cycles in the graph and assigning every agent in a cycle the
item of the agent she is pointing at.
– Consider the graph G1 and the allocations corresponding
to the cycle:
• Edges (e1, c1), (c1, c2), ..., (cn−1, cn), (cn, e2).
• If φ1 = 1, the edge (e2, 111). (Similarly, φ1 = 0, 011)
• For every i ≤ m, if φi = 1, the edges j ≤ ki −
1, (1ji , 1
j+1
i ) and the edge (1
ki
i , xi).
• For every i ≤ m − 1, if φi = 1 and φi+1 = 1, the edge
(xi, 1
1
i+1).
• If φm = 1, the edge (xm, e1).
– In G2, consider the allocations corresponding to the cy-
cles:
• For j ≤ n, let i be the lowest number such that xi = φi
satisfies clause cj , and let φi = 1, then a cycle involving
solid edges (cj , 1
j
i ), (1
j
i , cj). (similarly if φi = 0, a cycle
involving cj , 0
j
i ).
• For the remaining agents 1ji ∈ S (or 0ji ∈ S), agents
xi ∈ S (or x¯i ∈ S) and agents e1, e2, a self loop.
– In the allocation B constructed by implementing the cy-
cles we identified, every agent receives a weakly improving
bundle over their allocated bundle in A since they receive
items of both types that are weakly preferred according to
their local preferences. The agents cj and 1
j
i (or 0
j
i ) corre-
sponding to a satisfying valuation of the variable xi involved
in clause cj , receive strictly improving bundles by receiving
strictly preferred items of type 2 in B compared to A ac-
cording to their local preferences. Lastly, note that B is an
allocation on S since none of the items allocated in B were
initially endowed to any agent outside S. This shows that
S is a blocking coalition and B is a weakly improving al-
location on S, and strictly improving for some agents in S.
Therefore, J is a No instance.
Claim 2. (⇒) If J is a No instance, I is a Yes instance.
Proof. We are given that J is a No instance. Let S be a coali-
tion that blocks A w.r.t. preferences in P and let B be an
allocation on S such that (i) ∀a ∈ S,B(a)  A(a), and
(ii) ∃a ∈ S,B(a)  A(a).
• We start by proving some simple properties about the
membership of agents in S that are specific to our construc-
tion. Throughout, we will use the fact that B must be an
allocation where (a) @a ∈ S such that [B(a)]1 ≺ [A(a)]1,
and (b) ∀a ∈ S, if [B(a)]1 = [A(a)]1, then we must have
that [B(a)]2  [A(a)]2. Otherwise, if there is some agent
a∗ for which the allocation B fails to satisfy either of these
conditions, then B(a∗) ≺ A(a∗).
Lemma 3. For any i ≤ m, any j ≤ ki − 1, (i) if 1ji ∈ S,
then [B(1ji )]1 = [1
j+1
i ]1 = [A(1
j
i )]1, 1
j+1
i ∈ S, and (ii) if
any 0ji ∈ S, then [B(0ji )]1 = [0j+1i ]1 = [A(0ji )]1, 0j+1i ∈ S.
Proof. Let there be some agent 1ji ∈ S, i ≤ m, j ≤ ki − 1,
such that [B(1ji )]1 6= [1j+1i ]1. Then, according to her local
preferences in G1, [B(1
j
i )]1 ≺ [A(1ji )]1 and by her impor-
tance order 1B 2, B(1ji ) ≺ A(1ji ). This is a contradiction to
our assumption that B is an improving allocation for every
agent in S.
Lemma 4. For any i ≤ m, any 2 ≤ j ≤ ki, (i) if 1ji ∈ S,
then [B(1j−1i )]1 = [1
j
i ]1 and 1
j−1
i ∈ S, and (ii) if 0ji ∈ S,
then [B(0j−1i )]1 = [0
j
i ]1 and 0
j−1
i ∈ S.
Proof. By Lemma 3, 1ji must be assigned [1
j+1
i ]1 (or if j =
ki, one of the items [11i+1]1, [0
1
i+1]1, or [e2]1). Then, the item
[1ji ]1 must be assigned to another agent in S. Suppose an
agent a ∈ S, x 6= 1j−1i is assigned [1ji ]1 in B. However,
according to the preferences in G1, for every agent a other
than 1j−1i , the item [1
j
i ]1 is strictly worse than their allocated
type-1 item in A. Then, B(a) ≺ A(a) according to P , a
contradiction to our assumption that B is weakly improving
for every agent in S.
Lemma 5. For any i ≤ m, any j∗ ≤ ki, (i) if 1j
∗
i ∈ S,
then for every j ≤ ki, 1ji ∈ S, [B(1ji )]1 = [A(1ji )]1
and xi ∈ S, and (ii) if 0j
∗
i ∈ S, then for every j ≤ ki
0ji ∈ S, [B(0ji )]1 = [A(0ji )]1 and x¯i ∈ S..
Proof. If 1j
∗
i ∈ S, by Lemma 3, for every j = j∗+1, . . . , ki
agent 1ji ∈ S and [B(1ji )]1 = [A(1ji )]1, and by Lemma 4,
for every j = 1, . . . , j∗ − 1, agent 1ji ∈ S and [B(1ji )]1 =
[A(1ji )]1. If 1
ki
i ∈ S, [B(1kii )]1 = [A(1kii )]1 and xi ∈ S.
Lemma 6. For any i ≤ m, any j ≤ ki, if 1ji ∈ S and
[B(1ji )]1  [A(1ji )]1, then either [B(1ji )]2 = [1ji ]2 =
[A(1ji )]2 or [B(1
j
i )]2 = [c
j
i ]2.
Proof. Every other type-2 item is strictly worse than
[A(1ji )]2 according to agent 1
j
i ’s local preferences in G2.
If [B(1ji )]2 /∈ {[1ji ]2, [cji ]2}, then B(j) ≺ A(j) according
to her preferences in G1 and G2, a contradiction to our as-
sumption that B is improving for every agent in S.
Claim 3. Let any agent cj∗ ∈ S, then for every j ≤
n (i) [B(cj)]1 = [A(cj)]1 = [cj+1]1, cj+1 ∈ S,
(ii) if [B(cj)]2 /∈ {[a]2 : a is an agent 0ji
or 1ji corresponding to the valuation of a variable xi
that satisfies clause cj} then, B(cj) = [cj−1]2 = A(cj),
and (iii) e1, e2 ∈ S,B(e1) = A(e1), and B(e2) = A(e2)..
Proof. If cj ∈ S, by the preferences in G1, we must have
that [B(cj)]1 = [A(cj)]1 = [cj+1]1 and cj+1 ∈ S (and if
j = m, [B(cm)]1 = [A(cm)]1 = [e2]1 and e2 ∈ S) since
every other item of type 1 is strictly worse. Now, the item
[cj ]1 must be assigned to some agent in S. However, the only
agent for whom the assignment of [cj ]1 is weakly beneficial
is the agent cj−1 (or if j = 1, the agent e1). By induction
we must have that if cj∗ ∈ S, every agent cj and the agents
e1, e2 are in S and their allocation of items of type 1 is the
same in B and in A. This proves part (i).
To prove part (ii), let us examine G2. Every other item of
type 2 is strictly worse than [cj−1]2 according to cj’s local
preferences in G2. If she receives any other item of type 2,
then B(cj) ≺ A(cj), a contradiction to our assumption that
B is improving for every agent in S.
Finally, agents e1 and e2 must be assigned [e1]2 and [e2]2
respectively since they do not strictly improve on their item
of type 1 in B. This completes the proof of part (iii).
Lemma 7. For every i ≤ m, di /∈ S.
Proof. We provide a proof by contradiction that if di ∈ S,
then S must involve every agent in our construction and that
there is no allocation B that improves over A.
Claim 4. If di ∈ S, [B(di)]1 = [01i ]1 = [A(di)]1 and 01i ∈
S.
Proof. Let us examine G1. If di ∈ S, we must have that
[B(di)]1 = [0
1
i ]1 = [A(di)]1, 0
1
i ∈ S, since every other item
is strictly worse according to her local preferences over type
1.
Claim 5. If di ∈ S, then for every 0ji , 0ji ∈ S, [B(0ji )]1 =
[A(0ji )]1 and x¯i ∈ S, [B(0ji )]1 = [A(0ji )]1 = [di]1.
Proof. If di ∈ S, the claim follows from Claim 4, Lemma 5,
and the fact that [x¯i] must be assigned to di if x¯i ∈ S accord-
ing to the preferences of every other agent in G1.
Claim 6. If a di∗ ∈ S, then (i) for every i ≤ n, di ∈ S and
B(di) = A(di), and (ii) for every j ≤ m, agent cj ∈ S and
B(cj) = A(cj).
Proof. Let us examine G2. For every i = 1, ...,m − 1,
if di ∈ S, we must have that [B(di)]2 = [di+1]2 =
[A(di)]2, di+1 ∈ S. Suppose for some i ≤ m − 1,
[B(di)]2 6= [di+1]2, then [B(di)]2 ≺ [A(di)]2. For i = m,
we must have that [B(dm)]2 = [cn]2 = [A(dm)]2 and that
cn ∈ S. Together with Claim 4 this proves part (i) of the
claim.
Part (ii) of the claim is proved by Claim 3 and the fol-
lowing argument. First we show that cn cannot enter into an
exchange with an agent 1ni (or 0
n
i ) corresponding to a val-
uation of xi that satisfies cn. If cn receives [1ni ]2 (or [0
n
i ]2),
then by Lemma 5, Claim 5 and Lemma 6, the agent 1ni (or
0ni ) must be assigned [cn]2 since she cannot be assigned a
strictly improving item of type 1 in B.
Let us consider agents cj in the order j = n − 1, . . . , 1.
We know that cj ∈ S and the item [cj+1]2 must already
be assigned to another agent. Then, cj must exchange items
with an agent 1ji (or 0
j
i ) corresponding to a valuation of the
variable xi that satisfies cj .
– If di ∈ S, then by Claim 6, Claim 4, Claim 5, Lemma 5 and
Lemma 6, S must be the set of all agents, and that the weakly
improving allocation B is exactly the allocation A. This is a
contradiction to our assumption that B is weakly improving
for every agent but also strictly improving for some agent.
• The final key step is to establish that any blocking coalition
S involves all of the agents cj , and for every i ≤ m, either
all of xji or all of x¯
j
i .
Lemma 8. Every weakly blocking coalition S consists of all
the agents cj , j ≤ n, and ∀i ≤ n, either (i) all agents xji , or
(ii) all agents x¯ji .
Proof. We start by showing that every blocking coalition S
must include at least one of the agents 1ji , 0
j
i , xi, x¯i, or cj
since these are the only agents with solid incoming or out-
going edges and every allocation B that strictly improves
over A must involve an assignment corresponding with one
of these edges.
Claim 7. If any cj∗ ∈ S or any 0j
∗
i∗ ∈ S or any 1j
∗
i∗ ∈ S,
then e1, e2 ∈ S, every cj ∈ S and for every i ≤ m, either
every agent 1ji ∈ S or every 0ji ∈ S
– Suppose cj∗ ∈ S. Let us examine her preferences in G1.
By Claim 3, for j ≤ n − 1, we must have that [B(cj)]1 =
[cj+1]1 = [A(cj)]1, and cj+1 ∈ S. By induction, cn ∈ S.
– If cn ∈ S, we must have that [B(cn)]1 = [e2]1 =
[A(cn)]1, e2 ∈ S since every other item of type 1 is worse
according to G1.
– If e2 ∈ S then either [B(e2)]1 = [111]1, and 111 ∈ S or
[B(e2)]1 = [0
1
1]1, and 0
1
1 ∈ S since these are the only two
items that are weakly preferred over [A(e2)]1.
– For any i ≤ m, if 1j∗i ∈ S, then by Lemma 5, for every
j ≤ ki, 1ji ∈ S and xi ∈ S. (Similarly, if for any i ≤ m, any
0j
∗
i ∈ S, then for every j ≤ ki, agent 0ji ∈ S).
– For i ≤ m−1, if xi ∈ S, then either 11i+1 ∈ S or 01i+1 ∈ S
since in the case that xi is not assigned one of the items
[11i+1]1 or [0
1
i+1]1 in B, any other item of type 1 assigned
to her must be worse than [A(1kii )]1 according to the pref-
erences in G1, a contradiction to our assumption that B is
weakly improving for every agent in S. Similarly, if x¯i ∈ S,
then either 11i+1 ∈ S or 01i+1 ∈ S.
– Finally, if xm ∈ S (or x¯m), then we must have that e1 ∈
S, since [e1]1 is the only item that is weakly better than her
allocation in A according to G1.
– If e1 ∈ S, we must have that c1 ∈ S since [c1]1 is the only
item that is weakly preferred over [A(e1)]1 according to G1.
– Thus, if any agent 1ji , 0
j
i , xi or x¯i is in S, then we must
have c1 ∈ S. We have already established that the existence
of any cj ∈ S implies that for every i ≤ m, either all 1ji ∈ S
or all 0ji ∈ S.
– Finally, we will show that there is no blocking coalition S
such that for some i ≤ m, any j ≤ ki, j′ ≤ ki the agents
1ji ∈ S and 0j
′
i ∈ S. Suppose for the sake of contradic-
tion that such a coalition exists. we must have by Lemma 3,
Lemma 4 and Lemma 7 that both xm, x¯m ∈ S. However,
by Lemma 7, we know that dm /∈ S which implies that both
xm and x¯m must get [e1]1 in B since every other item is
strictly worse than their allocations in A according to pref-
erences in G1. This is impossible since items are unique and
indivisible.
Lemma 9. If 1ji ∈ S, [B(1ji )]1 = [A(1ji )]1 = [1j+1i ]1 (if
j = ki, [xi]1).
Proof. Every other item of type 1 is strictly worse for agent
1ji according to G1. Similarly, if 0
j
i ∈ S, [B(0ji )]1 =
[A(0ji )]1 = [0
j+1
i ]1 (if j = ki, [x¯i]1).
•We will now prove that: If there is a coalition S that blocks
A, there is a satisfying assignment to F .
We now describe the construction of a valuation φ that
satisfies the formula F in the instance I by examining G2
and argue that such a valuation must exist. We start by noting
that since agents cj and agents 1
j
i , 0
j
i cannot strictly improve
over their allocations of type 1 according to preferences in
G1, they must weakly improve their allocation of items of
type 2.
– Let us examineG2. We know by Lemma 7 that none of the
agents di are in S. We have also shown that c1 ∈ S. Agent c1
must receive an item [11i ]2 (or [0
1
i ]) where the corresponding
valuation of the variable xi satisfies c1 and the agent 11i (or
01i ) is in S. Otherwise, every other item of type 2 is strictly
worse than her allocated item of type 2 in A and together
with the fact that c1 does not receive a strictly better item of
type 1 in B, we have that B(c1) ≺ A(c1), a contradiction to
our assumption that B is weakly improving for every agent
in S. Further, agent 11i (or 0
1
i ) must receive the item [c1]2
since every other item is strictly worse. Set φi to be 1 if c1
gets [11i ]2 and to 0 if c1 gets [0
1
i ]2 in B.
– Similarly, agent c2 cannot assigned [c1]2 since it must be
assigned to some agent 11i (or 0
1
i ) and agent c2 must ex-
change items with agent an agent 12i (or 0
2
i ) that corresponds
to a satisfying valuation of a variable xi that satisfies clause
c2. By an inductive argument, we must have that for every
j ≤ m, agent cj receives the item of an agent 1ji or 0ji that is
in S which corresponds to a satisfying valuation of variables
xi that satisfies the clause cj . For each clause, set φi to be 1
if cj gets [1
j
i ]2 and to 0 if cj gets [0
j
i ]2 in B. Note that each
clause cj is satisfied by a variable whose value is consistent
with the final value according to φi since the value of φi
can never change once set by Lemma 8. The agents involved
correspond to a consistent valuation of the variables and all
of the clauses must be satisfied simultaneously.
This completes the proof. Given an instance I of 3-SAT,
we can construct in polynomial time, a corresponding in-
stance J of InStrictCore, such that I is a Yes instance iff J
is a No instance.
Definition 4 (StrictCoreNonEmpty). Given a multi-type
housing marketM , agents’ preferences P , and an allocation
A, we are asked whether the strict core of M is non-empty.
Theorem 4. StrictCoreNonEmpty is NP-hard.
Proof. We will show a reduction from 3-SAT. An instance
I of 3-SAT is given by a formula F in 3-CNF consisting of
clauses c1, . . . , cn involving Boolean variables x1, . . . , xm,
and we are asked whether there is a valuation of the variables
that satisfies F . Each clause cj is a disjunction of exactly 3
literals cj = lj1∨lj2∨lj3 . Each literal li is either the variable
(positive literal) xi or its negation (negative literal) x¯i. Each
of lj1 , lj2 , lj3 corresponds to the positive or negative literal
of one of the variables x1, . . . , xm.
•We define the following ordering W on positive and neg-
ative literals of the Boolean variables where positive literals
are ranked over negative literals and literals of variables with
lower index are ranked over literals of higher index. Let li, li′
be any two literals. Then, li W li′ if either: (1) i ≤ i′ and
if either (i) li = xi, or (ii) li = x¯i and li′ = x¯i′ . (2) i ≥ i′,
li = xi and li′ = x¯′i.
Example 6. The order on the literals in Example 5 is x1 
x2  x3  x¯1  x¯2  x¯3.
• For every clause cj = lj1∨lj2∨lj3, the literals are indexed
so that lj1 W lj2 W lj3.
We construct an instance J of CNE as follows:
Agents:
• For every clause cj , add the agents c1j , c2j , c3j .
• For every variable xi, add agents xi.
• For every variable xi, add agents 1ji , 0ji for every clause
cj that involves variable xi.
Preferences:
• Agents c1j : (1jj1 , c1j+1)  (1jj2 , c1j+1)  (1jj3 , c1j+1) 
(c1j , c
3
j )  (c3j , c3j )  (c1j , c2j )  (c1j , c1j )  others. If j =
n, replace cj+1 with c1. For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if ljk = x¯jk ,
replace 1jjk with 0
j
jk
.
• Agents c2j : (c2j , c3j )  (c2j , c1j )  (c3j , c3j )  (c3j , c1j ) 
(c2j , c
2
j )  others.
• Agents c3j : (c2j , c1j )  (c2j , c2j )  (c3j , c1j )  (c1j , c1j ) 
(c3j , c
2
j )  (c1j , c2j )  (c2j , c3j )  (c3j , c3j )  (c1j , c3j ) 
others.
• Agents 1ji :
– If li = xi ∈ cj , j ≤ ki, (c1j , 1j+1i )  (1ji , 1ji )  others.
If j = ki, replace 1
j+1
i with x(i+1) mod m.
– If li = xi /∈ cj , j ≤ ki, (1ji , 1j+1i )  (1ji , 1ji )  others.
If j = ki, replace 1
j+1
i with x(i+1) mod m.
• Agents 0ji :
– If li = x¯i ∈ cj , j ≤ ki, (c1j , 0j+1i )  (0ji , 0ji )  others.
If j = ki, replace 0
j+1
i with 0(i+1) mod m.
– If li = x¯i /∈ cj , j ≤ ki, (0ji , 0j+1i )  (0ji , 0ji )  others.
If j = ki, replace 0
j+1
i with 0(i+1) mod m.
• Agents xi: (xi, 11i )  (xi, 01i )  (xi, xi)  others.
Initial endowments: Each agent x is initially endowed
with a bundle O(x) = (x, x).
High level idea:
• The preferences are structured so that type-1 items are
used to track satisfaction of individual clauses, while
type-2 are used to ensure a consistent valuation of the
Boolean variables and satisfaction of all clauses.
• Borrowing from the Example 2.2 in (Konishi, Quint, and
Wako 2001), if c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j only receive each others’ items
in an allocation, there is a blocking coalition. For an allo-
cation to be individually rational and stable, agent c1j must
receive an item of type 1 from an agent 1ji or 0
j
i .
Example 7. [Example 2.2 in (Konishi, Quint, and Wako
2001)] Consider the multi-type housing market with agents
N = {1, 2, 3}, p = 2 types and the following preferences.
Agent 1: (1, 3) 1 (3, 3) 1 (1, 2) 1 others.
Agent 2: (2, 3) 2 (2, 1) 2 (3, 3) 2 (3, 1) 2 (2, 2) 2
others.
Agent 3: (2, 1) 3 (2, 2) 3 (3, 1) 3 (1, 1) 3 (3, 2) 3
(1, 2) 3 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (1, 3) others.
The strict core is empty for the market above.
Claim 8. (⇒) If I is a Yes instance, J is a Yes instance.
Proof. We start by define a lexicographic order Q on valu-
ations. Given two valuations ψ, ω ∈ Φ, let i be the lowest
value such that ψi and ωi differ. We rank ψ over ω if ψi = 1
(ωi must be 0i).
Example 8. In the Example 5, the valuation (1, 1, 0) is
ranked over (1, 0, 1).
– Let Φ be the set of satisfying valuations to F . Let φ be
the top ranked satisfying valuation according to Q. We will
construct an allocation A w.r.t. the valuations in φ that is a
core allocation.
Allocation A:
• A(c1j ) = (1ji , c1j+1) if li is the highest ranked literal ac-
cording to W that satisfies cj when xi = φi. If li = x¯i,
replace 1ji with 0
j
i .
• A(c2j ) = (c2j , c3j ).
• A(c3j ) = (c3j , c2j ).
• A(1ji ) =
– (c1j , 1
j+1
i ), if li = xi is the highest ranked literal ac-
cording to W that satisfies cj when xi = φi.
– (1ji , 1
j+1
i ), otherwise.
If j = ki, replace 1
j+1
i with x(i+1)modm
• A(0ji ) =
– (c1j , 0
j+1
i ), if li = x¯i is the highest ranked literal ac-
cording to W that satisfies cj when xi = φi.
– (0ji , 0
j+1
i ), otherwise.
If j = ki, replace 0
j+1
i with x(i+1)modm
• A(xi) = (xi, x1i ).
– Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that S blocksA. Let
B be an improving allocation on S. We will show that B
corresponds to a satisfying assignment to F that is ranked
lower than φ, and B must be strictly worse for some agent
in S.
– We start by showing that S must involve at least one of the
agents c1j , 1
j
i , or 0
j
i .
If either of c2j or c
3
j are in S for some j ≤ n, then we
must have that all the agents c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j are in S. If c
2
j ∈ S,
we must have that c3j ∈ S, otherwise, c2j gets a strictly worse
allocation in B. If c3j ∈ S, we must have at least one of
the agents c2j or c
1
j ∈ S, otherwise she gets a strictly worse
bundle in B than in A. If only c3j , c
2
j ∈ S, and c1j /∈ S,
neither agent can strictly improve over their allocation in A.
Therefore, we must have c1j ∈ S.
– Let [A(c1j )]1 = [O(1
j
i )]1 (or 0
j
i ) and [B(c
1
j )]1 = [O(1
j
i∗)]1
(or 0ji∗ ). Then agent 1
j
i∗ (or 0
j
i∗ ) corresponds to a literal li∗ in
clause cj that is ranked weakly on top of li according to W .
Otherwise, c1j is strictly worse off in B than in A according
to the preferences in the construction, a contradiction to our
assumption that B is improving for every agent in S.
– If any one of c1j ∈ S, then every agent c1j ∈ S. Every agent
c1j must be assigned [B(c
1
j )]2 = [O(c
1
j+1)]2, otherwise she
is strictly worse off in B. This also implies that c1j+1 ∈ S (if
j = k, replace j + 1 with 1).
– If 1ji ∈ S (or 0ji ), then 1j+1i ∈ S (0j+1i ) and 1j−1i ∈ S
(0j−1i ). For agent 1
j
i to weakly improve her allocation in
B over her allocation in A, we must have [B(1ji )]2 =
[O(1j+1i )]2 (if j = ki, replace 1
j+1
i with 1i+1). Otherwise,
1ji is strictly worse off in B.
Some agent in S must receive the item [O(1ji )]. Let agent
a ∈ S, a 6= 1j−1i be assigned item [O(1ji )] in B, then by
her reported preferences, agent a is strictly worse off with
her allocation in B compared to her allocation in A, a con-
tradiction to our assumption that B is improving for every
agent in S.
– For some pair j, j′, we cannot have both 1ji , 0
j′
i ∈ S. Sup-
pose we have both 1ji and 0
j′
i in S, then we must have both
1kii and 0
ki
i ∈ S. However both of the agents 1kii and 0kii
must be assigned the single item [O(xi+1)]2 in B to weakly
improve over their allocation in A. Therefore one of the two
agents must be strictly worse off in B, a contradiction to our
assumption that allocations in B are weakly preferred over
A by every agent in S.
– We have shown that S must include all the agents c1j cor-
responding to clauses cj , for every i either all of the agents
1ji or all of the agents 0
j
i and that for every cj , an agent 1
j
i or
0ji corresponding to a valuation of a variable xi that satisfies
cj .
– Let ψ be the valuation that is constructed as follows: for
every clause cj , if c1j receives a type-1 item endowed to
agent 1ji , we set ψi = 1. Note that every cj receives such
an item and this corresponds to a valuation of the variable xi
that satisfies cj , and that once a variable takes a value, it is
never changed again i.e. the value of ψi is always consistent
with a value that satisfies all clauses cj considered previ-
ously. Therefore, the values of the variables in ψ constitutes
a satisfying valuation.
– Now, consider the allocation B where the pairs of agents
c1j , 1
j
i (or 0
j
i ) exchanging items of type 1 is the same as in the
allocation A. Then B is not a strictly improving allocation
over A for any agent in S, a contradiction to our assumption
on the allocation B.
Let i∗ be the smallest value such that φi∗ 6= ψi∗ . If
ψi∗ = 1, then ψ is ranked over φ byQ, a contradiction to our
assumption that φ is the highest ranked satisfying valuation.
If ψi∗ = 0, (then φi∗ = 1), then consider the agent cj who
was assigned the type-1 item of 1ji∗ inA. By the construction
of A, cj must either receive the type-1 item of an agent 1
j
iˆ
in
B where iˆ > i∗, or of an agent 0j
iˆ
in B. In either case, cj is
strictly worse off inB compared toA since it corresponds to
a lower ranked literal according toW . This is a contradiction
to our assumption that every agent is weakly better off with
their allocations in B compared to A.
Claim 9. (⇐) If J is a Yes instance, I is a Yes instance.
Proof. Suppose A is a core allocation.
– Every agent c1j must receive an item of type 1 from an
agent 1ji (or 0
j
i ) where the corresponding literal of xi sat-
isfies clause cj i.e. we must have that [A(c1j )]1 = [O(1
j
i )]1
(similarly [O(0ji )]1).
For the sake of contradiction let c1j not receive an item
from an agent 1ji (or 0
j
i ). Then there are two cases: ei-
ther c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j are assigned each others’ items or one of
them is assigned the initial endowment of some other agent.
If c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j are only assigned each others’ initial endow-
ments, then by our construction of the preferences of agents
c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j by adapting Example 7 there is always a blocking
coalition to every such allocation, a contradiction to our as-
sumption that A is in the core. If c2j or c
3
j is assigned the ini-
tial endowment of an agent other than c1j , c
2
j or c
3
j , then the
resulting allocation is not individually rational by the con-
struction of agents’ preferences, a contradiction. If c1j is as-
signed the initial endowment of an agent other than an agent
1ji or 0
j
i corresponding to a satisfying assignment for the
clause cj , then again the resulting allocation is not individu-
ally rational.
– If 1ji (or 0
j
i ) exchanges her item type-1 item with an agent
c1j , then none of the agents 0
j′
i (similarly, 1
j′
i ) can exchange
items with some other agent c1j′ .
For the sake of contradiction, let 1ji and 0
j′
i exchange
their items of type 1 with agents c1j and c
1
j′ i.e they get
[A(1ji )]1 = [O(c
1
j )]1 and [A(0
j′
i )]1 = [O(c
1
j′)]1 respec-
tively. Then agents 1ji and 0
j′
i must get the assignments
[A(1ji )]2 = [O(1
j+1)]2 and [A(0
j′
i )]2 = [O(0
j′+1
i )]2 re-
spectively.
If 1ji ∈ S (or similarly, 0ji ), and [O(1ji )]2 is assigned to an-
other agent, then we must have that [A(1ji )]2 = [O(1
j+1
i )]2,
otherwise the allocation A is not individually rational.
By an inductive argument, we must have that the agents
1kii and 0
ki
i must both be assigned the single indivisible item
[O(xi+1)]2 for A to be individually rational, a contradiction
to our assumption that A is in the core since every core allo-
cation must also be individually rational.
– Each agent xi receives either one of [O(11i )]2 or [O(0
1
i )]2
since an agent can only receive a single item of a given type.
By our argument immediately above, if zi receives [O(11i )]2
in A, then only agents 1ji can exchange items with agents c
1
j
and none of the agents 0ji can exchange items with an agent
c1j .
– Now, consider the construction of a satisfying valuation φ
as follows: For every clause cj , if [A(c1j )]1 = [O(1
j
i )]1 (sim-
ilarly, 0ji ), set φi = 1 which must be an assignment to the
variable xi that satisfies clause cj . We have already shown
that such an assignment exists for every clause cj . Further,
once φi is set to a value, it can never change as we have al-
ready shown that if there is some cj such that [A(c1j )]1 =
[O(1ji )]1 there is no cj′ such that [A(c
1
j′)]1 = [O(0
j′
i )]1.
Therefore at every point where we verified the satisfaction
of a clause cj , the value of the variable xi in φi that satisfied
cj is the same as the final value of φi. Therefore, φ satisfies
F .
This completes the proof.
Summary and Future Work
We propose MTTC for multi-type housing markets with lex-
icographic preferences, and prove that it satisfies many de-
sirable axiomatic properties. There are many future direc-
tions in mechanism design for multi-type housing markets.
Are there good mechanisms when agents demand more than
one item of some type? Can we design strategy-proof mech-
anisms under other assumptions about agents’ preferences,
such as LP-trees (Booth et al. 2010)? What is the compu-
tational complexity of manipulation under MTTC? What if
agents’ preferences are partial orders such as CP-nets only?
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